EKP – VEU

Kaatuuko euroalueen pyramiditalous?

Kreikan ja muiden velkaisimpien euromaiden rahoituskriisi uhkaa koko euroalueen talousnäkymiä. Suuri osa pohjoisten euromaiden ylijäämistä on peräisin juuri niistä etelän alijäämämaiden velkavetoisista kulutusjuhlista, jotka pian päättyvät pakkosäästämiseen. Euroalueen pyramiditalous on vaarassa, arvioi tunnettu eurokriitikko.

Euroalueen sisäinen talous muistuttaa keskeisiltä osin tyhjän päälle pystytettyä pyramidihuijausta, joka uhkaa nyt Kreikan ja muiden velkaisimpien euromaiden rahoituskriisistä kaatua omaan mahdottomuuteensa. Vaakalaudalla on siis myös ylijäämämaiden talous.

Näin tylyn kärjistyksen takana on euron ja euromaiden rahaliiton tunnetuimpiin arvostelijoihin kuuluva ekonomisti Bernard Connolly, joka on jo pitkään ennustanut euroalueen ajautuvan sisäisten tasapaino-ongelmiensa ja rahaliiton rakennevikojen takia vakavaan kriisiin.

Connolly oli 1990-luvulla EU:n komission rahapoliittisen osaston johdossa, ja tuli tuolloin tunnetuksi saatuaan potkut rahaliittoa ja eurohanketta koskevien kriittisten puheenvuorojensa takia. Nykyisin hän johtaa perustamaansa Connolly Global Advisers -analyysiyhtiötä.

Nyt euroalueella on käynnissä juuri sellainen talouskriisi, jonka ainekset ovat Connollyn mukaan olleet olemassa euron syntymästä asti. Alijäämämaiden velkavetoinen kasvu on tullut tiensä päähän, ja seuraukset ulottuvat pelkkiä alijäämämaita laveammalle kautta koko euroalueen.

Velkakupla varmisti euron menestyksen

Viime vuonna kirjoittamassaan artikkelissa Germany and the EMU Ponzi Game (suomeksi suunnilleen Saksa ja Euroopan rahaliiton pyramidihuijaus) Connolly kuvailee kattavin perusteluin, kuinka koko euroalueen talouskasvu on rahaliiton alusta asti perustunut suurelta osin eteläisimpien euromaiden ylivelkaantumiseen.

Euron ensimmäisen vuosikymmenen menestys oli Connollyn mukaan tavallaan suuri velkakupla, joka on vasta nyt finanssikriisissä ja taantumassa alkanut puhjeta.

Saksan ja muiden harvojen ylijäämäisten euromaiden ylijäämät ovat Connollyn mukaan pitkälti peräisin nyt kriisiin ajautuneiden euroalueen alijäämämaiden velkavetoisista kulutusjuhlista. Talous kasvoi pohjoista myöten niin kauan kuin etelä otti lisää velkaa ja eli yli varojensa. Tässä peruste pyramidi-rinnastukseen.

Samoilla linjoilla on kansainvälisten suursijoittajien arvostama analyysiyhtiö GaveKal Research, joka on kuvannut euroalueen ylijäämä- ja alijäämämaiden kohtalonyhteyttä manipuloinnin kehäksi (Europe’s Circle of Manipulation).

GaveKal on laskenut, että euroalueen suurimpien ylijäämämaiden, Saksan ja Hollannin, ulkomaankauppa muiden euromaiden kanssa on ollut melkein yhtä rutkasti ylijäämäistä kuin euroalueen alijäämämaiden ulkomaankauppa on yhteensä alijäämäistä.

Ei yhtä ilman toista. Kun rahoituskriisi pakottaa alijäämämaat kutistamaan velkavetoista kulutustaan ja ennen kaikkea tuontiaan, menevät saman tien ylijäämämaiden vientinäkymät uusiksi.

Rahaliiton kokoonpano poliittinen kompromissi

Connolly muistuttaa, että Kreikan ja muiden velkaisimpien euromaiden talous on kulkenut kohti tämänhetkistä kriisiään rahaliiton perustamisesta ja euron käyttöönotosta asti.

Kriisin siemenet kylvettiin samalla hetkellä, kun käytännössä kaikki eteläiset euromaat liitettiin rahaliittoon voimakkaasti yliarvostetulla valuuttakurssilla. Saksa sitä vastoin siirtyi euroon hyvin edullisella valuuttakurssilla.

Tästä euron jyrkästi kaksijakoisesta lähtöasetelmasta on Connollyn kanssa samaa mieltä toinen tunnettu euroasiantuntija, London and Oxford Capital Markets -yhtiön johtaja David Marsh.

Tämä Connollyä kiistattomammin arvostettu suursijoittajien neuvonantaja käsittelee kattavasti rahaliiton ja euron taustaa, kehitystä ja haasteita viime vuonna ilmestyneessä kirjassaan The Euro.

Connollyn ja Marshin mukaan euron alkuasetelmat perustuivat pelkkää talouspolitiikkaa laajempaan eurooppalaiseen politiikkaan, mikä käytännössä kasasi euroon alusta asti paljon kompromissin aineksia.

Rahaliiton heikkoudet alusta asti tiedossa

Marshin mukaan yksi eurohankkeen keskeisistä tavoitteista oli rauhoittaa Manner-Eurooppaa, joka oli viime vuosisadan alkupuolella kärsinyt kahdesta tuhoisasta suursodasta ja myöhemmin ollut kylmän sodan päänäyttämöjä.

Saksa oli viime vuosisadan kummankin suursodan keskipisteessä, ja nyt sillä on keskeinen rooli rauhaa varmistavassa rahaliitossa. Tämä ei ole sattumaa, arvioi Connollyn ja Marshin lisäksi esimerkiksi kansainvälisen politiikan ja talouden riskianalyyseihin erikoistunut analyysiyhtiö Stratfor.

Rahaliiton perustamisesta lähtien oli ainakin Marshin mukaan tiedossa, etteivät Etelä-Euroopan maat hevin täyttäisi Saksan vaatimia tiukkoja talousehtoja. Italian ja myöhemmin Kreikan mukaantulo oli ennemmin poliittinen kuin taloudellinen päätös.

Connolly ja Marsh katsovat Saksan kilpailukyvyn ja samalla maan vaurastumisen olleen koko europrojektin toteutumiselle tärkeitä ehtoja.

Rahaliittoa perustettaessa Saksalla oli käynnissä historiallinen ja lisäksi erittäin kallis Itä- ja Länsi-Saksan yhdistäminen, eikä maa olisi lähtenyt euroon ilman varmuutta uuden valuutan vakaudesta ja maan oman kilpailukyvyn säilymisestä.

Jos Italia ja muut Välimeren rantavaltiot olisivat jääneet euron ulkopuolelle, olisivat ne voineet kilpailla Saksan kanssa vanhalla konstillaan antamalla omien valuuttojensa heikentyä heikentymistään.

Euron yliarvostus rasittaa eniten kriisimaita

Euromaat eivät voi turvautua talouskriisiin ajautuneiden valtioiden ikivanhaan hätävaraan eli oman valuuttansa devalvoimiseen.

Euron arvo määräytyy vapaasti valuuttamarkkinoilla, eikä siihen ole euromaiden kansallisilla viranomaisilla mitään sanomista. Jos euron ulkoista arvonkehitystä joku talousviranomainen vahtii ja tiukan paikan tullen pyrkii ohjaamaan, on tuo viranomainen koko euroalueen keskuspankki EKP.

Kreikan drakmojen, Italian liirojen ja useimpien muiden nykyisten alijäämämaiden vanhojen valuuttojen vaihtaminen euroon yliarvostetuilla vaihtokursseilla merkitsi Connollyn mukaan, että nämä maat päätyisivät melkoisella varmuudella juuri niihin ulkomaankaupan alijäämiin, jossa ne nyt ovat.

Samainen euroon sisäänleivottu ylikurssi osaltaan kiihdytti kriisimaiden kilpailukyvyn heikkenemistä. Näin yliarvostettu euro rasittaa parhaillaan kaikkein ankarimmin heikoimpien euromaiden taloutta.

Liian matala korkotaso vauhditti velkaantumista

Alijäämämaiden velkaantumista pahensi se, että EKP sääti koko euroalueen korkotason lähinnä yhdistymiskustannuksiaan sulatelleen ja hitaasti kasvaneen Saksan oloihin sopivaksi.

Nopeammin kasvaneille reunamaille korkotaso oli aivan liian matala, mikä osaltaan kiihdytti näiden maiden yksityistä ja julkista velkaantumista. Kreikan ja Italian julkinen velka on pitkälti yli sata prosenttia maan vuotuisesta bruttokansantuotteesta. Espanjan kokonaisvelka on yli 300 prosenttia maan bkt:stä.

Velkaantumista vauhditti lisäksi se, että rahoitusmarkkinat erehtyivät hinnoittelemaan yksittäisten eurovaltioiden velkakirjoja ikään kuin ne olisivat liittovaltion jäseniä – ja viime kädessä vahvimman jäsenensä Saksan vastuulla.

Valtioiden velanotto halpeni houkuttelevan edulliseksi, kun markkinat tarjosivat auliisti pitkäaikaista lainarahaa Kreikan kaltaisille valtioille lähes samalla korolla kuin Saksalle.

Vasta nyt markkinat ovat oivaltaneet, että Kreikan valtioon liittyy sittenkin toisenlainen luottoriski kuin Saksan valtioon, ja maiden välinen korkoero on kasvanut suurimmilleen lähes kymmeneen vuoteen.

Euron arvon pitäisi romahtaa alle puoleen

Connolly näkee kaksi keskeistä keinoa kriisistä ulospääsemiseksi.

Kumpikaan ei ole helppo, eikä kumpikaan säästä kriisimaita tai edes euroalueen harvoja ylijäämämaita vakavilta vaurioilta. Kumpikaan ratkaisu ei ole myöskään poliittisesti helppo, vaan voi herkästi laajentaa talous- ja rahoituskriisin poliittiseksi kriisiksi.

Ensimmäinen vaihtoehto kriisin hoitamiseen on Connollyn mukaan alijäämämaiden auttaminen euron erittäin voimakkaalla heikentämisellä. Rapautuneen kilpailukyvyn elvyttäminen edellyttäisi hänen mukaansa todella raskasta euron heikentymistä, edes 50 prosentin arvonlasku ei hänen mukaansa riittäisi.

Korkeimmillaan yli 1,50 dollarin käyneen euron olisi heikennyttävä ainakin 60 senttiin ennen kuin eteläisimmätkin euromaat kykenisivät nousemaan tästä kriisistä vientivetoisen talouskasvun avulla.

Erittäin suuri devalvaatio olisi välttämätön, sillä vain pieni osa alijäämämaiden viennistä ulottuu euroalueen ulkopuolelle.

Euron railakkaan heikkenemisen sivuvaikutuksiin kuuluisi inflaation kiihtyminen Saksassa ja muissa ylijäämämaissa totuttua huomattavasti nopeammaksi. Connollyn mukaan on hyvin epävarmaa, suostuuko Saksa euron voimakkaan heikkenemisen lisäksi esimerkiksi seitsemän prosentin inflaatiovauhtiin.

Velkakriisiä tuskin ratkotaan tukiaisin

Toinen ratkaisu olisi Connollyn mukaan Saksan ja muiden ylijäämämaiden sitoutuminen alijäämämaiden alijäämien kattamiseen.

Tähän tarvittaisiin Connollyn laskelmien mukaan vuosittain noin seitsemän prosenttia ylijäämämaiden kansantuotteista. Kyse olisi hänen mukaansa pysyvästä tulonsiirrosta, ei siis tilapäisestä raha-avusta saati lainasta.

Ikuisen piikin avaaminen alijäämämaiden tueksi olisi Connollyn mukaan poliittisesti kova pala purtavaksi – etenkin maksajamaissa. Käytännössä tällainen ratkaisu tuskin tulee kyseeseen.

Mitoiltaan tarvittava tuki olisi hänen mukaansa maksajamaille melkein yhtä suuri taakka kuin Saksalle ensimmäisen maailmansodan jälkeen määrätyt sotakorvaukset. Tuolloin Saksa ei niitä maksanut, vaan käynnisti ennemmin uuden sodan.

Suursijoittajia neuvova varainhoitaja John Mauldin esittää markkinakatsauksessaan kaksi muutakin ratkaisukeinoa Kreikan ja muiden ylivelkaisten valtioiden umpikujaan: julkisen talouden tasapainottaminen pikaisin pakkokeinoin tai vararikko.

Vaihtoehdot ovat vähissä ja pelkästään niin huonoja, että Mauldinin mukaan koko EU on nyt pahassa pinteessä.

Plaza.fi 17.2.2010-Talous Sanomat 17.2.2010

Welfare Finland – Gone with the EU

TEAM, International Conference 24.3.2007 Wil, Schwitzerland

Thank you very much for inviting me to this conference in Wil. I have to apologize that I cannot stay until Sunday, but I have to be in Helsinki early on Sunday.

We are living very interesting times. Tomorrow, on the 25th of March there will be a lot of celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, which was the foundation of European integration.

At the same time there is a growing amount of people that say no the European Union. According to the opinion polls 71 % of the Finnish people oppose the EU.

The population of Finland is now 5,2 million around 8,7 % of the EU. We do not have much to say in EU, even if our politicians say that Finland is in the hard core.

Our unemployment rate is still high, its 7,3 %. For young people less than 25 years it is 17.8 %

(Fig.1, Eurostat, jan. 07).
We have a labour force of 2.575.000.

Finland is paying to EU 930,8 million Euro during 2006 – 2007. During the 13 years we have been members of EU we have paid a total of 2,55 milliard Euro. The depression from the 90’s has not improved as fast and on all the sectors where it should do. We still have enormous problems with elderly care, children’s day care, the seriously disabled and public health services (a shortage of doctors and nurses). Some of these problems could have been helped with the money we have paid to EU.

Finland is now richer than ever

Last year’s economic growth in Finland was the best over the last ten years. The growth of GDP was 5,5 %. The average growth is 3 % in the euro-zone. (Fig. 2. Statistical Central Office, HBL 2.3.07). The main reason to this growth is that the export grew 11 %. A very ironic fact is that the forest- and paper industry that really shows a big growth, nearly 20 %, has just in the end of last year closed down two big mills in Finland. One mill is in Voikkaa and the other one in Kuusankoski. These areas are in the eastern part of Finland where the unemployment has been high and is getting even higher now. There are no other jobs for people in these areas.

At the same time the Finnish households have bigger loans than ever. The households are taking year after year bigger loans and they show now a deficit of 5,4 milliard Euro. A great deal of the loans are for housing and now, when the European Central Bank, ECB is increasing the interest rate, which they did already once this year, people are struggling. The banks in Finland are expecting an increase of the interest rates still two or three times this year. The situation is going to be very serious for a lot of families.

The poverty in Finland

Last Sunday we had the parliamentarian election. Unfortunately there was hardly any public debate on EU and only 67,8 % of Finns voted. Centre Party is still the biggest party, Matti Vanhanen is starting the Governmental discussions and most probably we are getting a right wing Government. Maybe Antti Pesonen will tell you more about the election tomorrow.

The big parties promised less taxes and more money for the students, elderly care, child day care and health services. Everyone can understand that this is not possible.

Before the election campaign started the director general of the economic department at Ministry of Finance Jukka Pekkarinen warned the politicians not to let the economical growth bluff them. He said that the labour force in Finland is decreasing very fast, in fact fastest in EU, because of the ageing.

(Fig 3. EU:n talouspoliittisen komitean ikääntymistyöryhmä).
In 2008 the need of the labour force is decreasing very rapidly And the critical period is going to be during these coming four years. The structural changes have to be done very fast.

Income disparity has grown during the last years in Finland

Vappu Taipale, general director of the National Research and Development Center for Welfare and Health (STAKES) is very worried about the poverty in Finland. It does not seem to be enough that a country has a good economy. The real problems are still there, we have the long term unemployment, single parents, parents with more then three children, mentally ill people. These categories seem to be very stable and nothing is done for them, says Vappu Taipale.

(Fig. 4. Social assistance and poverty, Stakes and Statistical Centre)
(Poverty in %, poverty under 18 years,
red = persons who get social assistance,
blue= children in families that get the social assistance)

The poverty in Finland has increased. We have now 600.000 people below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is 12 % of the population; in EU25 the per cent is 16 % and a total of 72 million people.
Who are the ones that live at risk-of-poverty in Finland? They are:

single parent households 27 %
families with three or more children 26 %
one-person households + 65 years 24 % and
one-person households under 35 years 41 %

(Fig. 5. Pasi Moisio/Yhteiskuntapolitiikka 71/2006:6, Stakes)
During the period from 1990 to 2004 all the other figures have increased, but not the one-person household over 65 years.

(Fig. 6. Eurostat, At-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers)
Here one can see that at-risk-of-poverty has increased in Finland with 4 % from the year 1996.

This so called welfare Finland has long bread queues all around the country. The church and different organisations distribute food for free to people. In these queues one can find also working people. Working poor has also grown in Finland. Working poor are often women that are working part time or/and even full time but have very low salary. Some of the people have two or three jobs, which means that they do not have any time for their families.

The social expenditure has grown year after year. In 1995 34.644 million Euro and 2005 it was 42.001 million Euro.
(Fig. 7. OSF Statistical Summary 4/2007)

Financing of this social expenditure comes mainly from the local authorities and state, total of 45 %. The local authorities pay now 19,2 % as they paid in 1995 16, 7 % and the state paid 29,3 % as they pay now 24,8 %. There has also been an increase on the amount that the employers pay; it is now 38,5 % as it was 33,7 % in 1995.
(Fig. 8. OSF Statistical Summary 4/2007)

Lisbon Strategy and the ‘Paras’ Project/Framework Act in Finland

The Lisbon Strategy that adopted in 2000 by European Council is an action and development plan for the EU. It aims to “make Europe, by 2010, the most competitive and most dynamic knowledge – based economy in the world”. Wonderful words!

The Lisbon strategy is heavily based on the economic concepts.

The Deputy Managing Director of The Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities, Mr. Kari-Pekka Mäki-Lohiluoma said in one of his speeches during the Finnish EU presidency, that “the European competitiveness comparisons have proven that the Nordic countries have succeeded in carrying out structural reforms without giving up their high quality welfare services.” He also said that the Lisbon Strategy has been put in practise the best in countries in which administration is decentralised.

I do not agree with him at all. The situation in Finland looks serious in many areas.

A project to restructure local government and services is in progress in Finland. The Council of State launched the project titled ‘Paras’ Project in spring 2005. (The word ‘paras’ means `best´ in Finnish, and is shortening of service and structural changes). A proposal for the Framework Act was forged in June 2006 and it came in force in February this year and expires at the end of 2012.

The aim is to:

improve the productivity of operations of local governments
restrain the growth of local government expenses
ensure that municipal welfare services remain of good quality and are available for all Finns
maintain municipal democracy close to municipal citizen

Finland has been a country with a good reputation of its social security work. Finland has now 416 municipalities; only 54 of them have 20.000 inhabitants, and only 19 that have over 40.000 inhabitants. It says in the Framework Act that health services are to be taking care of in areas that have a population of at least 20.000.

I would say that this Framework Act means that all services that are now close to people, such as

health services
schools
child day care
elderly care

are not possible after 2012.

We have already seen a lot of action towards this so far. Last year over 300 schools were closed. This has been a trend already for some years and we cannot see an end to it. The schools are getting bigger and bigger and the teachers are having more pupils in their classes.

Another example is merging from the health centres. Some of the health centres in the capital areas of Finland are not open 24 hours a day. This means that one has to fall ill only during the daytime, not before 8.00 a.m. and not after 4.00 p.m.

As this Framework Act requires a population ground of 20.000 for the health centres we can count that in future Finland we will have only a few health centres. As you know Finland is very sparsely populated country, with long distances. Now all the people have to move to the centres (Fig. 9. map), which in fact has been introduced in this Framework Act. The Government has put forward to the 15 regions to make their plans to merging municipalities.

This also means privatising of the services. Already now the municipalities buy some of services from private sector. Merging of the municipalities and working in bigger units, also means reducing the democratic rights of the citizens.

Privatising the services means that fewer people are making the decisions. One of the aims of the Framework Act is also to increase the productivity. In Finnish this means less labour force, more unemployed people and bigger profits for the private companies.

There is also a great fear that once the social services are privatised, there is no way to have employees on the municipal sectors if needed.

The Lisbon strategy says that the decisions are to be taken to the local level. But already this Framework Act in Finland shows that the decisions have been made by our Government and the local municipalities, and the local councils have had very little to say. This privatisation is narrowing the democracy and people don’t have anything to say. The social services are moving further away from the people.

More than 60 % of the population in Finland would like that the local authorities take care of the social services. People are even ready to pay more tax if they are sure that they can get the services.

There is no guarantee that the private sector gives a better value or has a better productivity of labour in the social service field. In fact researches show that in the private health service the productivity of labour and the value added has been declining all the time since 1975.
(Fig. 10. Olli Savela, Kuntapuntari 2/2006).

Lea Launokari
production manager, activist, Alternative to EU Information Centre, chair person
Kaksosmäki 24, 02400 Kirkkonummi, Finland
+358-9-298 1588 home, +358-50-5522330 mbl. Job
e-mail: lea.launokari(a)nettilinja.fi

Dåligt exempel för Sverige

FRI ATT PUBLICERAS HELT ELLER DELVIS!
Helsingfors 6.8.2003
Debattartikel av Gerd Söderholm

Införandet av EMU i Finland och några konsekvenser

ändska regeringarna utnyttjade överraskningsmomentet som taktik när Finland styrdes in i Europeiska unionen genom folkomröstningen i oktober 1994. Regeringarna förhindrade varje riktig debatt om den ekonomiska och monetära unionen. Detta var analogt med EU-kommissionens tysthetskrav som gick ut på att konsekvent vägra egna anställda publiceringstillstånd när de i offentligheten ville analysera de monetära följderna av en gemensam valuta.

Finländarna folkomröstade i en fråga som de i högsta grad fördes bakom ljuset i och vägrades en ny folkomröstning om EMU sedan det gått upp för dem att valutan gick förlorad redan i folkomröstningen 1994. På högsta regeringshåll försäkrades det inför folkomröstningen 1994 att vi varken kommer att förlora vår mark eller vår självständighet. Till skillnad från Sverige vägrades folket talan trots att det betalar priset för en gemensam valuta.

Det var helt enkelt inte meningen att människorna skulle förstå innebörden av den monetära frågan och därför fick ingenting ofördelaktigt för det monetära europeiska projektet komma ut i offenligheten. För de flesta finländare som inte hann med i det snabba politiska spelet var Maastricht ett abstrakt namn utan betydelse. Finländarna var omedvetna om att Maastrichtfördraget innebar att såväl valutan den finska marken som centralbanken Finlands bank och den självständiga penningpolitiken skulle offras. Våra politiker krävde inga som heslt undantag från Maastricht, ingen debatt förekom om några undantag.

Finlands bank är sedan den 1 december 2000, då den nya lagen om Finlands bank trädde i kraft, direkt underställd Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) in Frankfurt och har upphört att vara det ekonomiskpolitiska instrumentet för Finlands riksdag. Finlands bank är de facto försatt ur spel som institution för en nationell ekonomisk politik som skulle ha finländarnas bästa för ögonen.

Redan Harri Holkeris regering 1987-1991 började dra i de för EU rätta strängarna och yrka på strukturomvandling i landet, trots att statsskulden vid den tiden var låg, bara tio procent av BNP, arbetslösheten i det närmaste obefintlig och Finland Europas ”japanska under”. Finlands Bank användes på 1980-talet till att steg för steg styra den nationalekonomiska makropolitiken mot en avreglering av bank- och penningmarknaderna, uppmuntra utländsk låntagning inklusive kommunernas skuldsättning och göra avkall på sitt eget existensberättigande.

Den ekonomiska kraschen 1990-1993, den mest förödande någonsin i landets historia, var inte oberoende av Finlands anpassning till EU:s monetära unionspolitik. Efter inträdet i EU den 1 januari 1995 avstannade den politiska debatten för gott, den hade inte heller före inträdet varit så mycket att skryta med. Finland fick regnbågsregeringarna i vilka så många partier som möjligt bands till en och samma pro-EU-linje, som dikterades vara den enda rätta. Alla tyckte och skulle tycka lika. Den första regnbågsregeringen var Paavo Lipponens I regering 1995-1999. Den var målad i alla politikens färger, från vänster till höger, både socialdemokraterna, samlingspartiet (motsv. moderaterna), svenska folkpartiet, vänsterförbundet och de gröna ingick. Oppositionen, d.v.s. halva Finlands folk befann sig utskuffad i ett hörn, otrovärdig och frustrerad. 43 % hade röstat mot EU.

Det var centern och samlingspartiet under Esko Ahos (c) regering 1991-1995 som genomdrev svältkuren vilken resulterade i en för många ödesdiger skulddeflation inte skådad sedan 1930-talet. Priserna gick ner så lågt att när människor gått från gård och grund hade de fortsatta skulder kvar sedan bankerna tvingat dem sälja sina hem till underpris. Den finska arbetslösheten var 1990 bara 3,4 % men steg brant till 7,6 % 1991; 13,1 % 1992; 17,9 % 1993 och 18,4 procent 1994 då vi tangerade Spaniens rekord. Centern blev senare mera skeptisk till EU och fick inte delta i regnbågarna.

Den finska regeringen lät som EU:s mest exemplariska elev piskan vina över eget folk för att nå det utlovade priset som var deltagandet i den gemensamma valutan i kretsen av de första medlemsländerna.

Finland har stora svårigheter i dag, bl.a. en bestående hög arbetslöshet, alltför hög kostnadsnivå, alltför låga exportpriser, en misstrogen befolkning. Finland är inte ett bra exempel att visa upp för Sverige.

Många av de politiker och tjänstemän som drivit Finlands linje i riktning mot den blivande federala EU-staten har fått eller kommer att få höga poster i unionen där de avsvär sig lojaliteten med sitt land och förverkar det nationella förtroendet.

Fattigdom med brödköer

Ordet fattig förekom sällan förr. Finland var ett stolt land med god ekonomi.

Sedan Finland styrdes in i den ekonomiska och monetära europeiska unionen har landets inrikespolitik försämrats. Under de senaste tio årens integrationsprocess har förhållanden inträtt som fjärmat oss från den nordiska välfärdsmodellen.

Finland har annat att framvisa än Nokiamiljonärer – som det är tvivelaktigt att vara stolt över – d.v.s. brödköer som är medaljens baksida. Vi tvingades av våra politiker in i EMU och förlorade möjligheterna att driva en nationell politik och ha ett självständigt och konstruktivt samarbete med världens länder.

Vi fick de för ett nordiskt välfärdsland fula och skamliga brödköerna, men också andra negativa följder. Jag vill kort summera följderna i några sektorer: sysselsättning, inkomstfördelning, jordbruk, social- och hälsovård, skolväsen och industri. Denna summering är att betrakta som toppen av ett isberg.

EU:s arbetslöshet är 8,4 %, för ungdom 16,2 % (2002). Finlands arbetslöshet är 9.4 %, i vissa landskap 20 %. Dagligen rapporteras i medierna om uppsägningar, konkurser o. dyl.

Klyftan mellan rika och fattiga vidgas oavbrutet. De fattiga är inte alltid arbetslösa, vi har nu också arbetande fattiga, ”man begynte spekulera i arbetslöshet” för att tala med K.A. Tavaststjernas i romanen Hårda tider. Finns det tillräckligt många arbetslösa, kan lönerna sänkas och en person klarar inte levnadskostnaderna utan måste ha flera arbeten med försämrat fackligt skydd, dåliga arbetstider och arbetsvillkor. Detta är vad EU eftersträvar och kallar flexibilitet.

Finlands agribusinessektor har lidit. År 1992 hade vi 121 000 jordbruk, tio år senare (2002) var antalet 45 000. Myndigheterna vill ha ytterligare 15 000 jordbruk bort. Jordbruksarealerna hos enskilda jordbrukare har ökat när bönderna hyr ut jorden, men det betyder ökning av arbetslösheten också på landsbygden och ökad migration till tätorterna.

De sociala utgifterna har sjunkit från 30,0 % av BNP till 26,7 % (2000), vilket är lägre än både i Sverige och Danmark. Staten skar ner socialutgifterna mellan 1998 och 2001 med 2,1 %, så att kommuner som vill ha kvar sin standard på social- och hälsovården får tillskjuta mera pengar själva. Kommunerna har å sin sida stora svårigheter med finansieringen av den offentliga servicen när både staten och skattebasen krymper.

Skolväsendet har drabbats. På tio år har åttahundra (800) skolor stängts. Eleverna trängs i allt större skolor och får längre skolresor. Eleverna och lärarna stressas, lärare har permitterats, medan de ibland måste sköta flera klasser på samma gång.

År 1990 levde 30 000 familjer under fattigdomsgränsen som var 660 € per familj och månad. År 2000 var siffran 62 000 familjer, vilket är 10 % av alla barnfamiljer.

Brödköerna dök upp som nyhet i slutet av 1990-talet. I vissa städer och kommuner distribueras mathjälpen av kyrkorna och frivilliga organisationer en gång i veckan. År 2000 delade statskyrkan och organisationerna ut bröd till 100 000 personer. EU hjälper oss med denna mat till de fattiga och regeringen skäms inte för att ta emot den. Det gör jag å regeringens vägnar.

EU, or how to make a colony of a free nation-state

Thessaloniki, 21 June, 2003

In this paper, I firstly want to describe some characteristics of the Nordic welfare state. Secondly I will try to contrast this ideal of a welfare state against the policy performed in Finland as well as in the union since the end of the 1980-ies. My aim is to show, that there has been more of serving European union interests than Finnish interests, and that the welfare losses we have experienced are in fact due to the severe harmonisation policy we have been going through.

What is a welfare-state

Much of the public services are traditionally produced by the state in the Nordic countries. Publicly produced services are one trait of the Nordic welfare states. They are so called service-states in the sense that the public expenditures are more than sixty percent of the gross national product (62 % in 1995).

In other European Union countries they were around fifty percent 1995. If the state just transfers social services, which are mainly privately produced, it is a transfer-state. There is a third alternative to service-states and transfer-states, and that is the night-watchman-state. In a night-watchman-state the emphasis is mainly on defence, administration, security and law and order.

The traditional Nordic welfare state rests on four pillars: solidarity in wage policy, active labour market policy, active trade cycle policy and public sector expansion. Much of the welfare is the result of trade union work, or there would be no Nordic welfare state. The classical Nordic welfare state can be called an interventionist state, a social-state and a class co-operation state. Interventionism includes economic activity for welfare through tax collection, responsibility for securing full employment and fixing of public services as well as production regulation. The access to the public services and whether those services are obtained free of charge or must be paid for, must be examined as closely as their supply. Moreover, welfare societies must be judged on the basis of whether equal opportunities exist for all, and the manner in which we tend to the socially disadvantaged.

EU into the limelight

The welfare strategy in Finland and Sweden has clearly changed over the last 15 years, however. There is a tendency in the European Union, which is very strong in Sweden and Finland, which both became members of EU in 1995, to switch away from the service-state towards the transfer-state and to increase the role of private companies in welfare production. This, our governments declared, is necessary due to the high public indebtedness, high rate of interest costs, and to the continuous high unemployment eating public resources. We are moving in the direction of night-watchman-states as well. Guard companies came up like mushrooms. You can hardly pretend any more that the Nordic countries are exporting the Nordic economic model to the European Union, as many hoped when we entered the EU. The case is rather the opposite.

Boom-bust

Finland had an economic boom in the 1980-ies, but after that we experienced the worst economic crash ever seen in my country. It is called The Big Recession (Suuri lama). The main question is thus: was the recession due to external pressure on the Finnish governments, Sorsa 4. 1983-1987; Holkeri 1987-1991; Aho 1991-1995 and Lipponen 1995-1999, in order to incorporate Finland into the European Union and not the least into adopting the single currency, the Euro? Because before, until 1989, Finland experienced a boom with full employment, low debt and a good regional balance. Since then the policy and regime shifted in the direction of full European integration. There was no great demand among the public for any run on EU, however. The government made an insidious propaganda for something they could not be downright on. The Central Bank of Finland, during the 1980-ies, the steering national macroeconomic policy instrument, of course, step by step was used in order to deregulate banking and money markets, encourage foreign indebtedness, even by municipalities, and to slacken its own power and reason for being. I will return to the Central Bank of Finland later.

The currency, the Finnish Mark (FIM), was not an option, I mean threatened, at the time, they told us, although the Maastricht top meeting in December 1991 agreed upon the single currency union in three steps, and the Finnish negotiators did not care for any opt-outs in their EU-negotiations between March 1992 and March 1994. A consistent EU-friendly policy started in Finland favouring the export sector, stabilising the exchange rate, shrinking the deficits of the public sector (6.8.1992). The new monetary policy was put forward by the Central Bank of Finland aiming at a permanent inflation of 2 % towards 1995 (4.2.1993) .

The Finnish unemployment rate boomed in the process:

1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
3,4	7,6	13,1	17,9	18,4

When the Finnish people voted about EU-membership 16 October 1994, EU was offered us as the only solution to our big problems, the unemployment the biggest of them all. Unemployment rates provide an indication of the socio-economic health of the nation . Finland had become a sick nation.

The European Union aims at growing flexibility in the member states, so that the convergence criteria and the stability-pact of the economic and monetary union can be observed in face of the suppressed liberty of action in fiscal and financial policy matters in the member states. This means that people must move and flex, when the economic policy does not care to make politics to the benefit of people any longer. Previously Finland as a nation-state used to solve its own problems successfully. But Finland is now handicapped to do so, and suffers from mass-unemployment, uneven distributions, weaker welfare, environmental problems, powerlessness felt by people and brutal working life experiences, problems completely opposite to the ideal Nordic model.

EU-Dissidence

There is a heavy propaganda for international market liberalism solutions, but the international market liberalism is not capable of solving big macroeconomic problems anywhere in the world. Such problems are best solved by the nation-state itself. But then the problem is: Is there a nation-state named Finland with full competence to solve Finnish problems any more, or have we become a satellite? If we have become a satellite, then how big are our political problems, not to speak of the economic ones, if the borders of our nation is not equivalent to the borders of our state?

No one has yet suggested that Europe constitutes a nation.

Could it be that the whole thing and most of all the monetary union with its forerunner mechanism, the ERM, is part of a programme to subvert the political as well as economic independence of Europe´s countries? The person who came to realise this as a fact was cut down, becoming one of the first dissidents of the European Union. People instinctively know that their democracies have been overthrown. The proofs are given on the 427 pages of Bernard Connolly´s book ”The Rotten Heart of Europe, The Dirty War for Europe´s Money”. For it he was sacked from his work in the European Union and tried in court and condemned. Bernard Connolly was head of the EMS National and Community Monetary Policies Unit in the Commission. He wrote his book when on leave from his job. He was told that he had no right to do so, or to analyse the ERM, not even to think about it. Sokrates, Galileo Galilei were they tolerated. No. Heretics are never tolerated. But why on earth, call it freedom, democracy and openness in 2003.

Finnish Depression and ERM

The Finnish events can clearly be connected with the conclusions drawn by Connolly. The official propaganda, however, said something else. As already mentioned the scenario was that we had a boom in the 1980-ies and then a crash, which hit Finland even harder than the crash in the 1930-ies. Before, during and after the crash the government, leading politicians and media presented the one alternative plan to the Finnish people. This plan was about taking Finland smoothly into the union without disturbing debates.

Below are selected a few of the happenings concerning the Finnish road to the EMU.

1. In 1979 EMS (European Monetary System) was introduced in the EEC countries.
2. In 1986 Finland became full member of EFTA (European Free Trade Association).
3. During the Finnish boom in 1988 housing prices rose at a rate of over 30 % annually.
4. In 1989 the first company crashed on the Exchange.
5. In 1989 the Finnish government informed the parliament that they supported a common European Economic Sphere for EFTA and EEC in Western Europe.
6. In 1989 the chief of the savings-banks union (SKOP) committed suicide. In 1990 the unemployment rate in Finland was 3,4 %, the lowest since 1975.
7. In 1990 (autumn) the unemployment started to grow.
8. In 1990 the two German states united.
9. In 1991 the Swedish crown was tied to the Ecu.
10. In 1991 (May) president Mauno Koivisto declared to the government that at the moment Finland officially excludes EU-membership.
11. In 1991 (July) Sweden applied for membership in the EC.
12. In 1991 (December) the EC top meeting in Maastricht, Holland decided about the economic and monetary union with a single currency, a common central bank and a common monetary policy.
13. In 1992 (March) Finland decided to apply for membership in the EC
14. In 1993 (February) Finland starts negotiations about EC membership in Brussels accepting the Maastricht treaty.
15. In 1993 (August) has the unemployment risen fivefold to 500,000. Finland has 5 million inhabitants.
16. In 1994 (March) Finland and EU signed the negotiation result in Brussels.
17. In 1994 (October) Referendum about the EU-membership. 56,9 % voted for and 43,1 % voted against. A referendum o today might give the opposite result!
18. In 1994 (November) The parliament accepted the EU- membership for Finland.
19. In 1995 (January) Finland joined the EU and the EMS (European monetary system) and left EFTA.
20. In 1996 (October) Finland joined the exchange rate mechanism ERM.

The change of regime was not properly discussed. Hardly anybody knew that Maastricht meant the abandonment of the national currency. The policy was forced through by kind of decrees, only afterwards people realised what was going on. Because the decision process was too quick, people will not stop recapitulating afterwards. The book of Bernard Connolly is about why the Exchange-Rate Mechanism, the ERM, was damaging to the economies in its clutches. The attitude in my country is, however, that we caused our difficulties ourselves. There are since 1994, in compliance with the Maastricht treaty, a deepened economic and monetary policy cooperation governing public finances, overall economic policy and the position of the central bank . This means, of course, the traditional Nordic model cannot resist. Alarming unemployment and imbalance of public finances, typical of almost all Member States, which is also recognised by Finnish economists, no doubt upsets people and they naturally blame integration in the way it is pursued. A single market is one thing, which is acceptable to many. A single currency is something that came on top of it and is not demanded. A monetary union cannot resist without a political union. This can be seen here in Thessaloniki 2003 top meetings.

Maastricht = political union

Why should any country subordinate its domestic policy goals to the defence of the exchange rate? There are two possible answers. Firstly domestic policy goals, which are not economic, might be furthered. Secondly domestic goals might be subordinated to the exchange rate, if that advances the goals of some wider political entity.

The success of the Maastricht strategy depended on three conditions.

1)A price was promised – participation in a single currency (1997) so anything that threatened to derail the Maastricht timetable would reduce the incentives for the authorities to whip on the population to go through the pain barrier (starvation cure) in striving for the prize.
2) The authorities must continue to lust after the prize – or be allowed to by their electorates. Any doubts about their commitment to the single currency might lower their convergence pain threshold, or make them loosen their severe policies.
3) Third, the pain of convergence within the ERM must not become unbearable. If it did, then the markets might expect the runner to retire from the race, to rest outside. The markets, might consider factors such as recessions and unemployment be more important fundamentals than the Maastricht convergence criteria.

The Finnish rainbow governments in the 1990-ies can be explained by the fact that they tied all parties to the common goal and it was easier to show the population ”Look this is what everybody wants”, because a government that was not friendly towards EU could not be allowed to reach power. The Finnish governments were unwilling to miss the ”train”. Finland got the highest unemployment (together with Spain), almost 20 %, and a recession deeper than ever, but was completely overrun by the euphoric rush towards an unconditional EU membership performed by its governments even before anyone had heard a word such as ”convergence criteria”.

The Finnish government, indeed, had learned the lesson of Bundesbank: ”Aspirant members of EMU should demonstrate their commitment to a sworn co-fraternity – all for one and one for all – on advance of full monetary union” . I would say that this fairly well reflects what really happened in my country. People in Finland are used to hardships and indeed the situation was unbearable, but the politicians pursued energetically something their electorate had not chosen them for. In the absence of information and discussion the helplessness of the people has been and still is paralysing. Not in their wildest fantasy could people then believe that they were cheated on their most precious possession, the independence of the country. The people felt, however, that the politicians played a double play and started to despise them. There is still a great confusion around.

The Finnish nightmare 1990-1993, debt-deflation, is not extraordinary though. Debt deflation, was described 1932 by Irving Fisher in ”Booms and Depressions”. Indebted people become over-indebted when incomes and interest rates do not correspond to their expectations. The over-indebted households meet with liquidity problems, they have to sell out their properties and when this happens on a mass scale, prices go down, they loose their houses while their nominal debts remain high. What is extraordinary is that we had to go through it all in order to place ourselves into a political union. A monetary union cannot last unless there is a political union. Who wants a political union, or who cares about one?

A dream came through

It is an old dream, is it not! Germany intended a Grosswirtschaftsraum in the Third Reich where the Reichsmark would be the leading currency in a German economic area. Within the German currency bloc, fixed exchange rates would be introduced to ease the way later to a currency and customs union. There would be a Bank of Europe, but ´For political reasons it could be undesirable to damage the self-esteem of member states by eliminating their currencies´. Initially individual countries would maintain their own currencies and would agree to permanently fixed exchange rates against the Reichsmark. The members would be Germany, Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. This scenario from the 1940-ies did not include France.

In the 2000-s progress has been made by unionists. National currencies and national Central Banks have been eliminated. Finland is the only country in Scandinavia so far, which has eliminated both its currency and its Central Bank. Denmark and Sweden have pursued a more clever policy. Norway and Island are not members of EU. The new law about the Central Bank of Finland came into force 1, December 2000. The Central Bank of Finland no longer is the instrument of the Finnish parliament and people. It is by law subordinated only to the European Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt.

”EU:n tulevan keskuspankin tulee olla mahdollisimman riippumaton. Keskuspankin johtoon valittavat ovat ensisijaisessa vastuussa yhteisen valuutan vakaudesta. Heidän pitää pystyä tekemään päätöksiä, jotka eivät aina ole mieluisia kaikille jäsenvaltioille.”

— Hans Tietmeyer, Saksan keskuspankin pääjohtaja (HS 29.11.97)

”Ranskalainen historioitsija Emanuel Todd ennustaa, että rahaunionin toteuttaminen tulee johtamaan Euroopan katastrofiin. Yhteisestä valuutasta on tullut Jumalan korvike, sanoo Todd. Ne kristillisdemokraatit ja oikeistolaiset miehet, jotka ohjaavat Eurooppaa, ovat menettäneet uskonsa Jumalaan ja korvaavat tämän uskomalla Ainoaan Valuuttaan ja keskuspankin erehtymättömyyteen.”

— Emanuel Todd, ranskalainen historioitsija (Dagens Nyheter 29.1.97)